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National prerogatives in
multilateral peacekeeping: Italy in
Lebanese perception and Rome’s




1 After  the  2006  Israeli  invasion  of  South  Lebanon and  the  ensuing  military  conflict
between Hezbollah fighters and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), the UN Security Council
adopted  Resolution  1701  (12 August  2006)  which  redefined  the  role  of  the  United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)1. It resolved to increase troop numbers and
expand its mandate, thus inaugurating UNIFIL II. Resolution 1701 came to fruition after
intense  diplomatic  efforts  by  the  Italian  government  which  held  an  international
conference  in  Rome  on  26 July  2006.  With  the  adoption  of  Resolution  1701,  Italy
contributed a  significant  number  of  troops  to  the  peacekeeping  mission while  also
providing the key commanding figures. 
2 UNIFIL II is generally considered a successful mission. Apart from some objections and
criticisms which have taken root, mainly in Europe, it is noteworthy that the Lebanese
government and the Lebanese population consider UNIFIL II vital to preserving peace
in South Lebanon. Furthermore, UNIFIL commanders are, by and large, trusted by both
civilian communities and local political leaders.
3 Beyond classical Foreign Policy analysis, this article aims to explain why Italy has been
crucial in the successful establishment and management of the UNIFIL II mission from
2006 to the present, all this, whilst building and preserving unanimous recognition and
appreciation for its leadership within the UN mission. It contends that the leading role
played by Italy within UNIFIL II was decisive in legitimizing the establishment of the
mission  in  2006  and  its  evolution  thereafter.  Legitimacy  and  legitimization  are
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theoretically distinguished in peacekeeping operations, with legitimacy being the de
jure international recognition, while legitimization the de facto acceptance of foreign
contingents  on  a  sovereign  territory  by  local  political  actors  and  populations.
Challenges to the legitimization of UNIFIL II in 2006 were potentially dependent on the
tie-in of the mission itself with the Arab-Israeli conflict: well-defined political stances
of the countries involved could reflect an alleged partisanship and thus question the
interposition force as well as imperilling officers on the ground. 
4 In this article, I argue that two variables made Italy the most trusted power to act as an
interlocutor with the Lebanese government, population and political actors involved in
the ceasefire,  including Hezbollah.  First,  unlike most  of  the western powers,  Italy’s
approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict relied on a long-standing tradition of neutrality
epitomized by the equivicinanza (“equal proximity”) policy. Secondly, a positive historic
memory of Italian troops in Lebanon (from 1982 to 1984)2 rooted among Palestinian and
Shi’a communities made Italy the most appropriate façade player within UNIFIL II. 
5 Italy’s  successful  leading role in UNIFIL II  –embodied by the Force command of  the
mission from 2007 to 2010, and from 2012 until now, as well as in the command of the
West  sector from 2006 until  now– has allowed the UN-sponsored mission to play a
significant  role  in  South  Lebanon.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  containing
destabilizing clashes over the Israel-Lebanon border, thus substantially harmonizing
Israeli and Hezbollah interests. Emphasizing national prerogatives in dealing with local
actors, Italy also led UNIFIL II towards a de facto acceptance of the political order in
Lebanon, and in particular the cooperation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF). This circumvents the de jure general principle of UN peacekeeping, which
relies  on  the  aspirational  restoration  of  a  liberal  order,  and  a  Western  idea  of
sovereignty based on the State’s monopoly of the coercive force. 
6 This article builds on theoretical literature on multilateral peacekeeping and historical
reconstructions of the Lebanese civil war and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. Accounts of
Italy’s military and diplomatic role in the legitimization process are extracted from 36
semi-structured  surveys  that  I  conducted  in  Beirut,  Chatila,  Chamaa,  Naqoura,  and
Blida between 2010 and 2014. I, ultimately, relied on official interviews with General
Franco Angioni,  former Commander of  ITALCON –the Italian contingent which took
part  in the Multinational  Force (MNF) in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984– General
Guglielmo  Luigi  Miglietta  and  General  Vasco  Angelotti,  former  commanders  of  the
Italian UNIFIL base in Chamaa, and General Paolo Serra, current Commander of the
UNIFIL II.
 
Legitimacy and Legitimization in peacekeeping
operations: a theoretical overview
7 After the end of the Cold War, multilateral peace operations have become a privileged
tool of  international  politics,  with the purpose of  ending conflicts,  establishing and
maintaining peace, as well as building states and institutions. During the last decade
the number of multilateral peace operations has risen to more than 130 missions in
50 countries3.  Reiterated failure,  lack  of  effectiveness,  as  well  as  objection to  peace
operations, has raised the question of legitimacy, however. 
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8 According to Ian Clark, three interlinked factors can define legitimacy in International
Society: i) international political consensus; ii) legality and iii) moral authority4. On the
one hand, the first two factors relate to the enforced international mandate, and expect
a mission to be more or less legitimate in accordance to the number of members of the
international community that agree upon it. The third, on the other hand, considers
whether external military or civilian operators are perceived as trustworthy, reliable
and truly super partes or not. As Jett puts it, failure of peacekeeping mainly occurs when
either one side or all involved actors in a conflict do not recognize the authority of the
peacekeeping force5. In regards to those critics, the United Nations has been stressing
the  importance  of  internal,  rather  than,  external  consensus  of  the  three  basic
principles that UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations are based on: i) Consent of the
parties; ii) Impartiality; iii) Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the
mandate6. 
9 Those principles are also included in the 2008 “Capstone Doctrine of the Department of
Peacekeeping  Operations  (DPKO)”,  which  underlines  the  importance  of  cooperating
with local and national leadership in order to enforce the legitimacy of the mandate, as
well  as  preserving  stability  once  the  mission  is  over7.  When  dealing  with  local
leadership, however, a critical objection can be raised, when considering the selection
of  local  or  national  interlocutors.  Hansen,  for  instance,  has  critically  examined the
criteria according to which the UN usually tends to chose interlocutors on the ground
and  concludes  that  arbitrary  selection  often  ends  up  being  a  factor  of  further
fragmentation  instead  of  catalysing  a  comprehensive  dialogue  between  conflicting
parties8. Selection of interlocutors, in other words, is related to what Richardson sees as
the unspoken dimension of peacekeeping operations, which is based on the restoration
of peace and the return to stability –thus on the pre-judgment that the ground “was
somehow far removed from the liberal conception of a pre-existing peace”9.  In this
perspective, the UN tends to choose interlocutors who are allegedly prone to accept a
liberal order and to cooperate with the West. This approach not only contradicts with
the empirical durability of conflict dynamics, or “negative peace” in post-peacekeeping
areas, but, above all, completely refuses to deal with alternative political orders that 
adopt  methods  based  on  a  deep  understanding  of  contextual  political,  social  and
economic realities10. 
10 Ian  Hurd  also  proposes  a  critical  theoretical  approach  to  international  military
humanitarian interventions, investigating how legitimacy can be created, manipulated,
and  misused  as  a  tool  of  power  politics.  Combining  realist  and  constructivist
approaches,  Hurd  conceives  legitimacy  as  strictly  interlinked  with  perception  and 
interest11.  While  legitimacy does refer  to a  “normative and subjective” belief  by an
actor that a rule or an institution ought to be obeyed, this belief is “not necessarily
shared with any other actor”12. In line with the classical Weberian distinction between
what is legitimate and what is perceived to be legitimate13, Hurd argues that individuals
experience legitimacy in their perception of the rule or institution, and –as this is the
case with all perceptions– it is not directly accessible to outsiders14. 
11 Although it has been asserted that UN-sponsored military interventions are statistically
perceived as more legitimate than multinational or NATO-backed operations by virtue
of their lower politicization, empirical evidence also shows that, when narrowed down
to  a  merely  de  jure  definition,  legitimacy  ends  up  being  significantly  insufficient.
Following on Hurd’s approach to the “Anarchy of the International System”, I argue
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that  the  legitimacy  of  peacekeeping  becomes  a  full-fledged  concept  when  it  is
complemented  by  “legitimization”.  Tracing  back  to  Max  Weber’s  theory  of  power,
legitimization occurs when people who exercise power are recognized as legitimate in
fulfilling their task. Hard also defines legitimization as the “process of internalization
of a rule”15 –a bottom-up recognition by all actors engaged in the perception of a given
institution. 
12 When it comes to international peacekeeping, the most obvious challenge for a foreign
contingent is to be perceived as legitimate authority by all the parties involved in a
conflict,  including  actors  who a  priori  ideologically  refuse  liberal  organizations  and
liberal democracy or substantially conform to deep-rooted orders alternative to the
liberal paradigm. In this perspective, the conundrum stems from a double-directional
identity incompatibility, that is the impossible harmonization between an International
Organization  grounded  on  a  liberal  institutional  framework  and  local  actors  who
govern through different  ways of  conceiving and living sovereignty.  Therefore,  the
production of conflicting narratives of sovereignty and political order ends up being
the main hindering factor to a successful peacekeeping mission. 
13 In this paper, I consider the peculiar case of liberal institutions tacitly circumventing
the identity divide, by attaining a full-fledged understanding of the contextual rules of
a given political order and dealing with it  accordingly. Beyond façade rhetoric,  this
dynamic is likely to take place when a liberal institution, such as a UN Agency, pursues
a highest interest deriving from its action. This necessarily entails the hidden political
interest of a group of States pursuing it through the humanitarian machine. During the
2011 crisis in Syria,  for instance, it  has been shown that UN humanitarian agencies
conducted  negotiations  with  “terror  groups”,  in  order  to  make  food  delivery  and
humanitarian assistance succeed16. In this case, the everyday experience on the ground
of individuals  representing the UN apparently contradicts  the institution’s  identity,
applying a  realist,  rather than a liberal  paradigm, in accordance with the so-called
Machiavellian  principle  that  the  end  justifies  the  means.  This  means  that  the  UN,
although  rhetorically  bound  by  its  own  identity  narrative,  can  arbitrarily  choose
whether to play inflexibly or not, depending on the hidden interest in its action. 
14 The case of Lebanon shows that after the 2006 July war, UNIFIL II was only a viaticum to
securitize the Israel-Lebanon border. While all actors engaged in the conflict (Israel,
Hezbollah,  and  the  Lebanese  Government)  were  potential  beneficiaries  of  the
establishment of UN troops in the southern-Litani area, Hezbollah needed guarantees
about the maintenance of its prerogatives, in order to accept a ceasefire and Resolution
1701.  As  neither  the  US nor  France  could  be  relied  upon to  carry  out  an informal
negotiation, Italy was the only player able to cajole Hezbollah into accepting the UN
presence in South Lebanon by virtue of the consensus built from the Lebanese civil war
onwards. This example shows that the UN acted in accordance to realistic maxims by
tacitly exploiting the national prerogatives of one of its members in order to achieve
“legitimization”.
 
Italy’s diplomatic activism in the promotion of
UNIFIL II
15 On 12 July 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to the kidnapping of two Israeli
soldiers by Hezbollah; the 34-day long conflict witnessed intense air strikes on Dahiye,
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the  Shi’a  neighbourhood of  Beirut  and  Hezbollah  stronghold.  12,000 Lebanese  were
killed and 4,400 injured. In addition, approximately 1 million Lebanese were displaced
from  their  homes.  On  the  other  side  of  the  conflict,  170 Israelis  –among  which
52 civilians– were killed and around 600 injured. 
16 During the conflict, the intensity of Italian diplomatic activism was unparalleled in its
effort to reach a swift ceasefire. Romano Prodi, the newly elected Prime Minister (April
2006), held a peace conference in Rome, co-chaired by Italy and the United States, in
which he  expressed the  need for  establishing an ad-hoc  peacekeeping mission,  also
implying that Italy was ready to send its troops to Lebanon. The 15 diplomatic missions
attending the conference agreed unanimously to call for a full and immediate ceasefire,
and to provide humanitarian relief to the civilians of Lebanon; they jointly expressed
“deep  concern  for  civilian  casualties  and  suffering,  the  destruction  of  civil
infrastructures and the rising number of internally displaced people”, and in their final
statement called Israel to exercise its “utmost restraint”, thus paving the way for the
adoption of resolution 1701 on 12 August 2006 17.
17 UNSC resolution 1701 legitimated the deployment of peacekeeping forces –UNIFIL 2–
with the mandate of 18: a) monitoring the cessation of hostilities; b) accompanying and
supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in their deployment in South Lebanon,
including along the “Blue Line”19, c) coordinating its activities with the Government of
Lebanon  and  the  Government  of  Israel;  d) extending  its  assistance  to  help  ensure
humanitarian  access  to  civilian  populations  and  the  voluntary  and  safe  return  of
displaced persons; e) assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the
respect of borders and territorial control20; f) assisting the Government of Lebanon in
securing the border and also preventing the entry of arms or related materiel21.
18 Two days after the adoption of resolution 1701, the cessation of hostilities went into
effect. On September 7 and 8 Israel lifted its air and sea blockade on Lebanon and less
than one month later,  on October 2,  withdrawal  was complete.  In  early  September,
however, Israel was not fully convinced that calling troops back from Lebanon was the
best option, and –again– the solution came out of an Italian initiative: on September 7
Rome’s  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  travelled  to  Tel  Aviv  and  managed  the  lifting,
offering an Italian Navy vessel to patrol Lebanese waters until a German-led Maritime
Task Force would be deployed. The operation concretely started when Israel accepted
the  offer,  and  Italian  vessels  Garibaldi,  San  Giorgio,  San  Marco,  San  Giusto and  Fenice
constituted the Interim Maritime Task Force in support of the Lebanese Navy.
19 In order to understand the far-reaching success of Italian diplomacy in the adoption of
UNSC resolution 1701, it is noteworthy to compare it with moves by the US and France.
Indeed,  when the war erupted,  the United States blamed the “Party of God” in the
“strongest terms”, supporting, by and large, Israeli reaction to the kidnapping of two
Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah argued in response that the kidnapped soldiers were spies
but the National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones, stated: “this is a terrorist
attack and it is clearly timed to exacerbate already high tensions in the region and sow
further violence”22. 
20 The French position was very much in line with Washington’s statements. President
Jacques Chirac joined the White House in calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah and
blamed Iran and Damascus for backing what he considered “a terrorist attack”. It is
noteworthy  that  Chirac  did  not  agree  with  a  major  engagement  of  UNIFIL,  while
insisting that a solution might be better grounded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter23.
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21 Unlike Washington and Paris, Rome expressed its deep concern for a “spill-over effect
in the whole region” and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,  Massimo D’Alema, blamed
Israel for its “exaggerated reaction”24, although he never openly sided with one of the
two  parties  preserving  a  super  partes standing.  In  managing  a  crisis  which  could
potentially  affect  EU  security,  Italy  also  appealed  to  Brussels  for  an  enhanced
engagement, wishing for a European “willingness to become a political player”, after
having long been a “payer of economic assistance”25. 
22 The  UN-brokered  ceasefire  was  definitely  an  Italian  success.  Beyond  the  façade,
however, it is important to note that after suffering unpredicted casualties among its
ranks, Israel had already decided to withdraw from Lebanon. The red line in Israeli
military strategy is the human loss and the Hezbollah guerrilla had been framed in
accordance to this peculiar vulnerability with the aim of forcing the enemy to a retreat.
The  underestimation  of  Hezbollah’s  capacity  of  defence  and  resistance  was,  thus,
decisive for Israel and the US to turn towards a diplomatic solution. Italy, on its side,
was  able  to  capitalize  on this  juncture,  pushing  forward its  political  option,  which
ended by receiving unanimous international consensus with D’Alema congratulating
Washington for abandoning its doctrine of the War on Terror.
23 From a purely Italian perspective, a combination of international and domestic factors
fostered the newly elected government to push forward a peacekeeping initiative26.
After obtaining the parliamentarian majority in April  2006,  the centre-left  coalition
became particularly active in boosting a new trend in Italian foreign policy, in order to
smoothen Berlusconi’s tout-court Atlanticism. After 2001, Italy’s global role had been
marked by its unconditional backing of Washington’s War on Terror and emotional
support for Israel. Without cutting off US-Italy relations27, the new government tried to
balance  Atlanticism  with  Europeanis28.  Prime  Minister  Romano  Prodi  had  been
president of the European Commission from 2002 to 2004, and personally engaged in
the promotion of the European Neighbouring Policy (ENP). In Prodi’s view, all Europe’s
neighbours,  including the Mediterranean countries,  had to be considered a “ring of
friends”29 –a vision that very much influenced Italy’s new Mediterraneanism. Domestic
turnover and international context encouraged Italian activism in regards to the July
2006  Israeli-Lebanon  war.  Some  other  underestimated  factors,  however,  might  be
considered in analysing how Italy was not only able to gather international consensus
on  strengthening  UNIFIL’s  mandate,  but  was  also  identified  as  the  most  suitable
interlocutor  to  face  the  Lebanese  counterpart  despite  conflicting  views  with
Washington and Paris.
24 To  this  end,  it  is  important  to  underline  that,  for  American  and  French  interests,
strengthening the UNIFIL mandate was useful in limiting Hezbollah’s threats to Israel
and in  securing the  Lebanese-Israeli  border.  For  Italy,  instead,  resolution 1701  was
primarily grounded in humanitarian concerns and functional considerations to restrain
potential security spillovers. All actors involved needed an implicit or explicit window
of  dialogue  with  Hezbollah  but  neither  Washington  nor  Paris were  plausible
interlocutors to the “Party of God”. Washington had blacklisted Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization in 1982, and France, despite its special relationship with Lebanon, did not
entertain any diplomatic relation with the Shi’a party, while its pro-Israel, anti-Syria
and anti-Iran bias prevented it from bringing out any kind of serious negotiations30.
25 On the other hand, Italy relied on a portfolio of political attitudes, which placed it as
the only actor allegedly able to cajole Hezbollah into accepting the ceasefire and to
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turn UNIFIL II into a successful mission. First and foremost, Italy does not match up
with the colonial past of France and the United Kingdom, and self-rejection of its short
colonial  experience  in  Libya31 elaborated  in  the  national  consciousness  of  the  First
Republic,  has  broadly  sheltered  Rome  from  anti-imperialist  sentiments  of  radical
Middle Eastern actors. In addition, when it became clear that it would not been granted
any colony, Italy embraced the cause of decolonization –a card profusely played in the
construction of its pro-Arab stance during the First Republic32. In 2006, moreover, while
launching  a  renewed  Italian  Mediterraneanism,  Massimo  D’Alema  coined  the  word
equivicinanza (“equal  proximity”)  to  describe Rome’s  policy towards the Arab-Israeli
conflict along the lines of the tradition of equidistanza (“equidistance”) typical of the
Christian  democrat  party.  This  was  of  course  aimed  at  significantly  re-adjusting
Berlusconi’s enthusiastic and unconditional support of Israel. Since his appointment,
D’Alema re-established friendly relations with Arab counterparts, including Hezbollah33
–a shift stirring up huge disappointment in Tel Aviv, with newspaper titles claiming for
“The end of Italy-Israel love affair”34. In addition, after the adoption of resolution 1701,
the  Italian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  clearly  stated:  “It  is  wrong  to  say  that  our
soldiers go to Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah”35.  While explaining that UNIFIL II’s role
was to assist the Lebanese Armed Force in achieving full control of the territory, he also
wished a long-term integration of Hezbollah within the Military36. The “Party of God”
declared to  accept  UNSC resolution 1701 on 12 August  2006 –the day in which the
resolution was issued– despite explicit reference to “all militias disarmament” included
in the text.
 
Parallels in history: “Angioni’s peacekeeping pattern”
and Italy’s heritage in the memory of Lebanon
26 The most important asset Italy was able to employ in its sponsoring action of UNIFIL II’s
interposition force was the memory of Italian troops in Beirut between 1982 and 1984.
This constituted a pacesetter for establishing a UN mission in which Italy could play as
the forefront negotiator. 
27 On 2 July 1982, the Israelis established a military siege of the Lebanese capital, after
having  linked  up  with  the  Christian  Lebanese  forces  in  East  Beirut,  targeting  the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Syrian forces. Israel, however, had no
intention of attacking the enemy who blended in with the population. An international
crisis erupted: an intervention of UNIFIL was contemplated, but soon discarded. The
Security Council was not an affordable viaticum, since it was to a large extent blocked
by the 8 June 1982 US veto to a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon,
through which Washington had “made evident that it would not accept any decision by
the  Council  that  could  be  interpreted  as  sanctions  against  Israel  for  not  having
respected Security Council resolution 508 and 509”37.  The way out was found by the
then Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, who proposed a humanitarian option:
the evacuation of the PLO and the Syrians.  Israel  accepted and asked for American
troops  to  supervise  operations.  The  government  of  Lebanon  requested  French
assistance. Italy was also called to intervene as part of the Multinational Force (MNF).
500 soldiers, of the “ITALCON”, were sent to Beirut to perform the most delicate task:
the  evacuation  of  12,000 Palestinian  fighters  and  3,000 Syrian  soldiers  from  the
besieged  capital.  The  military  operation  lasted  12 days,  after  which  the  MNF  was
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disbanded. The worst crisis, however, was yet to come: the MNF was called back after
the huge massacre perpetrated in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps by
Christian militias and tacitly backed by the Israeli Defence Forces. The so-called MNF II
was reconstituted in a hurry by American, French and Italian troops, and was later
joined by the French. From a political  point of view, Italy had clearly stated in the
Venice declaration its neutrality in the conflict and the recognition for the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people. 
28 In  addition,  unlike  Washington  and  Paris,  Rome  was  merely  led  by  humanitarian
concerns38.  This  permitted  the  Parliament  to  easily  approve  the  dispatching  of
2,300 men to Beirut immediately,  also with the consensus of  the Italian Communist
Party39. On the ground, Italians elaborated a new practice of peacekeeping, which can
be attributed to General  Franco Angioni,  marking a difference from US and French
troops in the perceptions of local civil populations. The logistic division was favourable:
in  effect,  while  US  forces  settled  in  the  southern zone  of  Beirut  with  very  limited
contact with the population, and the French took control of the western part of the
town, Italians were assigned the centre. As Franco Angioni and Maurizio Cremasco put
it: 
The sector represents an important element in the concept of employment of the
military units engaged in peacekeeping operations, because it often influences the
decision whether units and population should be separated or merged. Separation
of  a  peacekeeping  force  from  the  civilian  population  can  help  its  political
opponents, as it does not permit the military force to demonstrate what it wants
and can do for the civilian population. On the contrary, separation increases the
opposition’s prejudice against the military force and the country it belongs to40. 
29 The  position  of  the  Italian  contingent  was  set  into  an  area  which  contained
approximately  600,000 inhabitants,  95 percent  of  whom  were  Shi’ites,  while  in  the
Palestinian camps of Shatila and Bourj el-Barajneh, the settlements included a large
Palestinian population. The main goal of the Italian contingents became the protection
of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, a task that could not be accomplished without the
collaboration  of  the  population  itself41.  For  the  US  or  France,  on  the  contrary,
peacekeeping entailed the elimination of  the enemy by full-fledged military action.
According to Angioni,  “this made the greatest difference between the perception of
American and French troops and that of Italian troops on the ground”42:  a fact that
eventually explains why the latter were spared the huge terror attack, in which 299 US
Marines and French troops were killed43.  Retrospective critical  analysis  of  the MNF
have underlined the political  mistakes and the error of the intransigent attitude of
Washington and Paris which led them to be perceived as occupying forces which, in
turn, provoked unnecessary casualties44. Not much attention, however, has been put on
the strategic errors of  the peacekeeping action,  compared to the Italian practice.  A
further intuition of General Angioni was to understand that the troops’ turnover, which
took place every four months,  negatively affected the transparent cooperation with
civilians  and  personal  contact,  intrinsic  in  the  Italian  model,  which  necessitated
continuity in order to be effective. To this purpose, Franco Angioni asked Rome for the
permission to maintain unchanged ITALCON’s commanding apparatus, and 60 units out
of 2,400 remained permanently in Beirut for 18 months45. 
30 Memories of Italian troops in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 have lingered on not
only among the Palestinian populations in the refugee camps, but also in the general
consciousness of the Lebanese people. Personal memories, recorded during my visit to
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the Shatila camp on 23 October 2010, recounted, for instance, of “the human touch of
Italian soldiers”, “the closeness between troops and the people”. Another trump card
for Italy was the field hospital, particularly vivid in the memory of the inhabitants of
Beirut  Wust-el-Balad during  1982  and  1984,  in  which  civilians  were  continuously
accommodated.
31 Italy’s  peacekeeping  practice,  in  harmony  with  the  local  population,  undoubtedly
created support  for  Italy  which capitalized it  in  2006,  when it  became clear  that  a
renewed peacekeeping mission was necessary in South Lebanon. According to General
Franco Angioni, “It is not by chance that in July 2006, when the humanitarian option
was explored again,  the Lebanese Premier,  Fuad Seniora,  called Rome before either
Paris or Washington”46. 
 
UNIFIL II and Italy: beyond the mandate
32 In 2006, Italy’s diplomatic success was proportional to the importance of its role within
UNIFIL. In accordance to the new international mandate, the size of the mission was
expanded  from  2,000  to  15,000 soldiers.  Italy,  since  2006,  surpassed  traditional  key
players like France, in terms of troop contribution and currently ranks as the second
top  contributor  with  1,097 troops47.  Washington  offered  financial  support  to  the
mission but never contributed troops to UNIFIL II. Italy’s prestige was also reflected in
the number of key places assigned to Italians in the organization’s structure, at both
the strategic and decision-making levels.  Since 2006 Italy has also been holding the
command of Sector West. In 2006, when the UNIFIL mandate was enhanced and the
mission renamed UNIFIL II,  the French General Alain Pellegrini,  UNIFIL Commander
since 2004, carried on this role until February 2007. Italian General Claudio Graziano
replaced him in the UNIFIL Headquarters in Naqoura, and stayed in office until January
2010.  He was  followed by Spanish General  Alberto  Asarta  Cuevas,  who commanded
UNIFIL II for two years. From 2012 to the present day, General Paolo Serra, another
Italian commander, has been leading the mission. It is also worth mentioning that in
2006, General Giovanni Ridinò was appointed head of the ad hoc Strategic Military Cell
(SMC) which was part of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation in New York. In
2007 Captain Giuseppe Guglietta was appointed Deputy Director, with the task of: i) 
supporting  the  DPKO  with  a  pool of  military  experts;  ii) creating  a  stronger  link
between  New  York  and  the  theatre  of  operations;  and  iii) involving  key  troop-
contributing countries (like Italy) in strategic military planning48.
33 Beyond the classical criticisms adressed to UNIFIL II regarding the ineffectiveness of
UN troops in disarming the protected zone south of the Litani River, it is also important
to evaluate how UNIFIL has contributed in improving and securing the mandate’s zone
despite these outcomes not having been prescribed by Resolution 1701. While it is true
that  UNIFIL  troops  have  never  found  evidence  of  weapons  allegedly  belonging  to
Hezbollah, a tacit agreement between the UN interposition force and the “Party of God”
seems to have determined the zones of influence. There is a general acknowledgement
in Lebanon that Hezbollah has moved its training camps from Southern Lebanon to the
Beqaa Valley, while training in Syria and Iran has increased. Evidence of Hezbollah’s
ongoing  preparation  for  battle  can  be  extrapolated  from  its  decisive  action  in  the
Syrian  conflict,  particularly  after  the  Qusayr battle  of  April-May  2013.  However,
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Hezbollah’s fighters, after 2006, have not been training within the UNIFIL II area which
Israel is able to monitor49. 
34 In addition, the UNIFIL II  mandate highlights the importance of UN support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces in deploying and re-establishing territorial control in South
Lebanon. However, Lebanon’s everyday experience and practice of security shows that
the  Army  is  not  an  independent  body  from  Hezbollah,  but  that  the  two  groups
collaborate at both the intelligence level and the strategic level50. Liberal definitions of
sovereignty, intrinsic in the UNIFIL II mandate, allow only for the national Army to be
the  official  holder  of  the  “monopoly  of  coercive  force”.  This  strengthens  the
paradigmatic  dichotomy  of  “State  vs.  non-State”.  However,  in  Lebanon,  the
collaboration between the Army and Hezbollah shows that the State and the non-State
are  hybridized51.  In  addition,  South-Lebanon’s  population  is  mainly  Shi’a,  its  local
politicians are often affiliated to the “Party of God”, and the strong presence of Shi’a
officers deployed, hides another potential dilemma for UNIFIL II. Therein lies a further
conundrum in the composition of an Army in a multi-confessional society52: officers are
simultaneously State servants and supporters of a confessional party. It becomes thus
obvious that the majority of Shi’a soldiers in South Lebanon simultaneously represent
the  Lebanese  State  and  Hezbollah.  It  is  widely  recognized  that  Italian  troops  are
involved,  more  than  others,  in  a  number  of  civilian  activities  that  benefit  local
populations and are engaged in a political dialogue with the local leadership which is
often pro-Hezbollah53. This is in line with the tradition of what I called “the Angioni
pattern”  which  has  inaugurated  the  Italian  tradition  of  peacekeeping  grounded on
neutrality and comprehensive dialogue54. Meetings between UNIFIL Italian troops and
local leadership are usually held in public offices where Hezbollah’s flags and pictures
of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, are exposed55. Since this fact
“never  hinders  those  meeting  to  take  place”56,  it  also  affirms  a  de  facto mutual
recognition between UNIFIL and Hezbollah.
35 Another tacit compromise between the political reality of UNIFIL member States and
the UNIFIL military action on the ground has emerged in May 2013 when the European
Union blacklisted the military wing of Hezbollah as a “terror group”. Criticism arose
immediately from South Lebanon. Ali Zahwi, the pro-Hezbollah mayor of the village of
Qabrikha stated: “We, as locals in the south, treated the UNIFIL like sacred guests, we
protected them. What do they return? Put us on the terrorist list”. Zahwi also affirmed
that  “people  are  not  going  to  accept  troops  living  among  them  and  calling  them
terrorists”57.  These  words  not  only state  de  facto  a  sort  of  equivalence between
Hezbollah  and  the  people  of  South  Lebanon,  but  they  also  recognize  the  mutual
collaboration between two organizations allegedly incompatible on paper. However, it
is noteworthy that, when the European Union finally decided to blacklist Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emma Bonino, strongly
opposed the intransigent European line – a position which was by and large echoed in
the Lebanese media, including al-Manar, Hezbollah’s official network58. 
36 Commenting  on  the  EU  decision,  General  Paolo  Serra  affirmed  that  collaboration
between UNIFIL II and local leadership –an essential tool in the strategic philosophy of
the  mission–  was  not  significantly  affected.  Although  “respecting  the  political
decision”, General Serra expressed “concern with a measure which could impact the
progressive integration of the military wing of Hezbollah into the LAF in the long-run”
59. This statement is in line with the 1989 Ta’ef agreement, which legitimized Hezbollah
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in  keeping  weapons  in  South  Lebanon  to  carry  on  the  anti-Israel  muqāwama 
(“resistance”) and formally shaped the peculiar two-faced pattern of security control in
Lebanon. It also shows respect for Hezbollah’s promise to put its weapons under the
authority of the State, once Israel will no longer be a threat. In practical terms, it stays
in line with General Angioni’s conviction that “[d]iplomatic agreements and political
instruments may, to a certain extent, be vague, because, once put into effect, they have
to allow freedom of movement”60. 
 
Conclusions
37 This  paper  aimed  to  demonstrate  that  UN  peacekeeping  missions  can  tacitly
circumvent the rhetoric imperative of acting in order to “re-establish a liberal order”,
when backed by a major political interest in securitizing a specific area. The UNIFIL II
mission  in  South  Lebanon  demonstrates  how  the  UN  can  deal  with  a  deep-rooted
political order which is not in line with the Western liberal paradigm. The conditio sine
qua non was that all actors involved in the 2006 July war shared interest in maintaining
the ceasefire and establishing an interposition force at the border between Lebanon
and Israel. In so doing, neither the US nor France were entrusted to represent UNIFIL,
given their  pro-Israel  and anti-Hezbollah political  bias,  while Italy stood out as the
most  reliable  actor  to  handle  the  Lebanese  puzzle.  Italy’s  “equivicinanza”  policy,  its
historical  unbiased  stance  towards  Arab  countries,  and,  most  importantly,  its
recognition of Hezbollah as a legitimate political player, were tactically acknowledged
at the international level as being of key importance in achieving a comprehensive
political legitimation of resolution 1701. Moreover, capitalizing on the positive memory
of ITALCON’s peacekeeping in Beirut, between 1982 and 1984, Italy was also strategically
crucial in attaining the legitimization of UNIFIL II  by the Shi’a populations of South
Lebanon. In so doing, Italy was able to assert the continuity of its commitment to post-
Cold War multilateralism, and to seek international prestige by associating UNIFIL II
with Rome’s national prerogatives.
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ABSTRACTS
Italy’s  role in the post-2006 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II)  is  generally
considered the crowning achievement of Rome’s foreign policy. Italy has played a major role in
promoting and developing UNIFIL II while also surpassing traditional powers in the region, like
the US and France, in importance. Elaborating on the “legitimacy-legitimization” dichotomy in
international peace-keeping, this article contends that Italy’s prominent role within the mission
was decisive in accomplishing the legitimization of UNIFIL II  to Lebanese political actors and
southern populations. Two factors made Italy the most reliable player to interact with both the
society  and  the  government  of  Lebanon  after  the  Israeli  invasion  of  2006:  a  long-standing
tradition of “equidistance” (equidistanza) towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a positive memory
of the Italian contingent, ITALCON, operating in Beirut from 1982 to 1984. This article finally
argues that,  through UNIFIL II,  Italy’s  Mediterranean politics gained an autonomous position
while simultaneously affirming a proactive role within the UN. 
Pour l’Italie, l’engagement au sein de la Force Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban après 2006
(FINUL II) est considéré comme un élément de prestige de sa politique étrangère. L’Italie a joué
un rôle majeur dans la promotion et le développement de la FINUL II, montrant un activisme
supérieur à celui des puissances traditionnelles présentes dans la région, comme la France et les
États-Unis.  Cet  article  reprend  la  dichotomie  « légitimité-légitimation  »  dans  l’action
internationale de maintien de la paix internationale pour démontrer que l’activisme de l’Italie a
été décisif dans la légitimation de la FINUL II aux yeux des acteurs politiques du Liban et des
populations du Liban du Sud. Deux facteurs majeurs doivent être pris en considération: la longue
tradition  d’une  politique  d’équidistance  dans  le  conflit  israélo-arabe  d’une  part,  la  bonne
réputation du contingent italien à la suite de la mission ITALCON à Beyrouth entre 1982 et 1984
d’autre  part.  Ces  deux  éléments  mettent  l’Italie  en  position  d’interlocuteur  particulièrement
fiable face à la société et au gouvernement du Liban après l’invasion israélienne en 2006. Cet
article soutient que la FINUL II a permis à l’Italie de s’affirmer et de progresser dans sa politique
méditerranéenne, en contribuant également à renforcer son profil d’acteur au sein du système
des Nations unies.
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